An Official Malware Research Blog of SecNiche Security Labs. Analysis, straight from the hidden and underground.
Sunday, June 19, 2011
ToorCon Seattle 2011 - Browser Exploit Packs
We gave a talk at ToorCon about the high level details of BlackHole. We will be releasing more details and complete talk in the upcoming conferences that are scheduled later this year.
Monday, June 13, 2011
Botnet Resistant Coding - HITB
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Web malware infections are proliferating, and the online banking industry has become the hottest target. Stealthy bots play a critical role in the success of these attacks. In this paper,we propose a new approach to mitigating the impact of botnet infections.
Refer: HackInTheBox Paper
Saturday, June 4, 2011
Chrome Form Grabber - No One is Secure
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Google Chrome does not use WININET interface to communicate with the server. Google Chrome introduced the support of Web Sockets in order to avoid the complexities of asynchronous communication using XMLHttpRequest (XHR). Web sockets provide an ease of bidirectional communication.
The truth is Google Chrome has also fallen into the hands of predators. Our team has noticed and found traces of effective Google Chrome form grabber that performs incessant hooking into chrome.cpp network interface functions in order to capture all the data and URL to which request is sent. It means, in the coming time we will see bots equipped with robust Google Chrome form grabbing (SpyEye is already started) functionality. Let's have a walk around
1. In first step, Google Chrome PID is detected.
2. The PID maps to Google Chrome executable file (chrome.exe) on the hard disk present in the users directory in order to control the path of the application.
\Device\Hard Disk Volume1\Documents and Settings\Administrator\Local Settings\Application Data\Google\Chrome\Application\chrome.exe
3. The hook module initiates a callback function which is supposed to capture and store the information coming back from forms. The hook is installed in the chrome.exe and injection is initiated. When a user opens a gmail account page and submits data to server, the hook module executes callback function which retrieves the URL and POST/GET parameters before sending it to the server.
4. In order to execute the hook successfully, all the previous Object Entry Points (OEP's) are flushed and new OEP is initiated for different domains.
5. NT_Resume_Thread call is used effectively in the hook procedure and it seems that related hooked functions are found and called during run time based on patterns.
The below presented screenshot shows the debug layout of Google Chrome formgrabber
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Nothing is secure as it is proclaimed to be. Welcome Google Chrome to the malicious world?
Thursday, June 2, 2011
Virus Bulletin - Browser Malware Taxonomy
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Subscribers : A Browser Malware Taxonomy
Enjoy!
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